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7 think some future Mark Twain will fossick about among the foundations of the
great future South Africa and write an adaptation of the lines on Italy and Michel-
angelo- "It seems to me that the Almighty fashioned South Africa upon plans
supplied by Lord Milner!"'
i P Fiupairick to Lord Milner, 22 February 1905
in Fitzpatrick, Selected Papers, 1888-1906
Edited by A H Duminy and W R Guesl,
Johannesburg 1976
'The Liberal who applauds the Union in one breath and denounces the war with the
next, forgets that without the war Union itself would have been impossible, 'the
achievements of the Union Parliament cannot be detached logically from the man
whose administration revolutionised all existing standards of government in South
Africa. The public services of today, the whole framework of administration, areina
very special sense Lord Milner's creation... The principles he laid down, the efforts
he inaugurated, have passed into the hands of other men and are now reaping their
peaceful fulfilment... To say that he made no mistakes would be to claim an
inhuman standard of perfection for a man whose human qualities are the most
obviousofany to his friends. But the new South Africa is in the main his monument,
and opponents who repudiate his views continue to build on the foundations he laid
and follow policies of which he, and he alorte, is the author.'
Violei R Markham, The South African Scene,
London 1913, pp 147-8.
History Workshop
The years beiween 1886 and 1910 were amongst the most dramatic in the history of
southern Africa. Mineral discoveries at Kimberley in 1868, followed by the more
important discovery of vast seams of deep-level gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886,
inaugurated an industrial revolution whose socio-economic and political repercus-
sions constitute the major themes of Southern Africa's twentieth-century hisiory.
Whereas at the beginning of the period, Ihc region was still composed of a cluster of
British colonies, Afrikaner republics, African proleciorates and kingdoms, by 1910
the entire area as far north as Katanga was under British rule, and the societies of the
sub-coniinent were being increasingly meshed inloa single political economy. It was
a political economy, moreover, in which the vision expressed by Sir Alfred Milner in
1897 of *a self-governing white community... supported by a well-treated and justly
governed black labour force from Cape Town lo the Zambezi* was being given
effect —even if there is room for doubt about the precise definition of 'well-treated
and justly governed'.
A major colonial war (familiar to most as the Boer War) — perhaps the costliest
in lives and money during the 'scramble* for Africa — against the Afrikaner repub-
lics, as well as numerous 'little wars* against African people, had led to the creation
of a new colonial state south of the Limpopo. Moreover, with the unification of
South Africa in 1910, boundaries were drawn and a stale system brought into being
whose characteristics were to provide the foundation for the capitalist development
of South Africa and imperial ambitions in the region for the next half-century and
more. From this point of view, the conventional literature which dwells on the
'failure' of British policy in the period after the South African war, and bemoans the
'price* paid by blacks for British 'magnanimity* to the ex-Boer republics, is beside
thepoint-Il]Thegoal of British policy in Southern Africa — whatever the rhetoric of
the war yean — had little to do with granting Africans political rights, or with
'freedom and justice*. Imperial goals are determined by the interests of imperial
ends: in the case of southern Africa, there was no intention to change the property
relations already existing in the region, though the war and the reconstruction which
followed it were intended to transform the nature of the class structure of the
lerritory by hastening the development of a capitalist state, which would be more
fully capable of fulfilling the demands of the mining industry.
In the run-up to the war, in the construction of this new state and in drawing up
an imperial blue-print for the region as a whole. Sir Alfred Milner, British High
Commissioner for South Africa and the Governor of the Cape and Transvaal
between 1897 and 1905, played a significant role. Yet its character has been persis-
tently misunderstood by the historians. Milner the man has been overestimated;
while on the other hand the nature of 'Milnerism'[2], as an expression of
laie-nineteenth-century imperialism at both the ideological and practical level, has
been underestimated and indeed virtually unexplored. That this should be so is
perhaps not entirely surprising. As Geoffrey Barraclough pointed out in his
presidential address to the Historical Association of the United Kingdom in 1966,(3]
The fundamental postulate of western historiography... is that history is the key
to the explanation of events . . . The result has been to affect the historian's
attitude to his work in three ways: first an obsession with causality, or what Marc
Bloch once called the vain pursuit of 'the idol of origins*; secondly, an almost
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neurotic absorption in questions of motivation; and thirdly a dogmatic concen-
tration on the particular and individualistic aspects of history rather than on
trying to discover such common features... as can be discerned in past events.. .
Barraclough could have been writing specifically with the literature on late-
nineleenlh and early-twentieth-century South Africa in mind, where there has been
an 'obsession* with the immediate causes of the Anglo-Boer war, rather than with
the structural context within which it occurred; and 'an almost neurotic absorption*
in the questions of the individual motivations and personalities of Rhodes, Chamber-
lain and Milner without at any point locating them in an analysis of late-nineteenth-
century imperialism. Thus GH Le May in his critical study British Supremacy
in South Africa, 1899-1907, in analysing the 'causes' of the war, revealingly
entitles his chapter 'Sir Alfred Milner*s War'. For Le May, the conflict was simply
ihe product of Milner's calculations, /1/5 determination to put his 'grand design* into
practice.[4] Similarly Leonard Thompson in the Oxford History of South Africa
explains the war in terms of the pressure the colonial based South African League
was able to exert on Lord Salisbury's government (without actually analysing the
nature of the League or its socio-economic interests, for which see below p 67 ), and
of the personal decisions of Milner and Chamberlain:
Milner had a stronger will than Chamberlain. Consequently the Colonial Secre-
tary and the High Commissioner jointly carried Britain into a war with the
Afrikaner republics. Milner inflated the jingo forces and blocked the moderating
forces inside South Africa and presented Chamberlain with arguments for inter-
vention. .. 15]
Most recently, and most explicitly. Shannon in his Crisis of Imperialism places
the 'blame' for the war squarely on Milner's personality:
Milner saw further than most men, but he saw narrowly. He despised the eva-
sions and compromises inherent in political life which Chamberlain had to stoop
t o . . . He was the purest specimen of the intellectual ruthlessness and the claims
for the prerogative of informed intelligence fostered in Jowett's Balliol.(6]
As a result. Shannon argues, Milner quickly concluded that a radical reversal of
the current situation which was likely to lose South Africa for the empire, was
crucial, and he set about — one would believe almost single-handed — 'to push
matters to a crisis point*.[7] And, again, after the war — though admittedly here he
would appear to be interpreting Milner's own views on the subject (and probably
correctly). 'For Milner, compromise and reconciliation after the war was no better
than compromise and reconciliation before the war. He wanted not merely to defeat
the Afrikaners, but to get the Afrikaners to admit their defeat in an unconditional
surrender. The annexed Transvaal was at last the blank page upon which Milner
was to write what he wished*.[8]
Thus, not only is the war conventionally seen as the outcome of Milner's personal
preoccupations; the settlement after the war, and what is widely regarded as its
failure, is also put down to his mis judgment. Shannon attributed this 'failure' to
Milner's notion that the Transvaal was a 'blank page'. Donald Denoon, taking
his title for his work on the reconstruction period in the Transvaal from
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Robinson and Gallagher's dictum thai 'ihe empire wem to war in 1899 for a concept
that was finished, for a cause that was lost, for a grand illusion",J9J attributed the
•failure1 of the reconstruction period to Milner's political miscalculations, which
effectively united the Afrikaners against him, while bitterly dividing his potential
British allies. [10] Yet at another level it can be argued that Milner succeeded in
southern Africa better than he (with his deep suspicion of Afrikaner leaders)
realised. Together with his administrative coterie of young Oxford graduates —
contemptuously dubbed the Kindergarten at the time and the name stuckjll]—he
laid the foundations for a state which not only reflected the demands of twentieth-
century British imperialism but also fulfilled them.[12] Moreover the fact that this
stale, and indeed the whole sub-regional economy of southern Africa wrought in
these years, was characterised by far greater intervention in the lives of its inhabi-
tants, and by a racist ideology of segregation, was not simply the outcome of the
idiosyncracies of a single individual, but has to be located in the context of late-
nineteenth-century British history and its articulation with the imperatives of
southern African capitalist development.
n
When in 1897 Milner was sent to South Africa as Governor of the Cape Colony and
British High Commissioner with responsibilities for the whole of southern Africa,
he had already had a varied career. The details of this are well known, though their
significance is often missed. Here only the broadest outline must suffice. Born in
Germany in 1854, of icnglish parents, Milner was educated in Germany and at
King's College London, before a brilliant career at Balliol College Oxford brought
him in contact with the world of Jowett and John Ruskin and with the social
reformer, Arnold Toynbee, who remained a major influence over Milner's life and
thought long after his early death.
After an unsuccessful attempt to stand as parliamentary candidate, for the
Liberal party, Milner followed Chamberlain in his break with the Gladstonian
liberals, and in 1887 became Private Secretary to his friend and mentor. Lord
Goschen, when the latter became Chancellor of the Exchequer in Lord Salisbury's
Tory cabinet. In 1889 he accepted the position of Financial Adviser to Lord
Cromer's administration in Egypt, and followed this with five years as Chairman of
the Board of Inland Revenue (1892-7) before his posting to South Africa, to the
most challenging and delicate imperial mission of the time. His appointment was
widely acclaimed by men of every political persuasion: if anyone could solve the
South African conundrum it would be Milner, the 'model civil servant*.[13]
Despile this widespread contemporary approval and acclaim, the historians of
southern Africa have largely persisted in seeing Milner as some kind of single-
minded maverick, whose unEnglish dogmatism drew Britain into an unnecessary
and unwanted war, and South Africa into a hazardous peace and reconstruction.
Aparl from Bernard Semmel's pioneering work on the background of imperial
ideology, Milner has been portrayed outside of his social context for far too long.[14]
The historians of southern Africa have, by and large, ignored the extent to which
Milner's ideas were in tune with those of his contemporaries in the late 19th
century, while even Semmel does not explore in any detail the relevance of
these ideas for Milner's role in southern Africa. What is very clear from Semmel's
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account, however, and from the recent most illuminating article by Anna Davin in
History Workshop on 'Imperialism and Motherhood',[15] is the extent to which
Milner's ideas corresponded with the increasingly pervasive ideology of social
imperialism: an ideology which cut significantly across party affiliation, and, as
Milner himself realised, was at times closest to Fabian notions about the need for
greater state responsibility, naiional efficiency and planning; they were widely
shared too by the Liberal Imperialists and Unionists who so enthusiastically
supported Milner's appointment as High Commissioner. Social imperialism was not
only linked with a nexus of ideas about Britain's imperial role, but as Davin points
out, tended in turn to go with 'ideas about the imperial race and the threat of its
diminishing vitality' and the crude eugenics of Karl Pearson and the social
Darwinists. Indeed Sidney Webb's approving quotation of Asquith could as well
have been written by Milner:
. . . Mr Asquith is on the right track. What is the use of Empire (he asks) if it does
not breed and maintain in the fullest sense of the word an Imperial race? What is
the use of talking about Empire, if here, at its very centre, there is always to be
found a mass of people, stunted in education, a prey to intemperance and con-
gested beyond the possibility of realizing in any true sense either social or
domestic life.[16]
As, in their different ways, Semmel and Gareth Stedman Jonesll7] have shown, the
ideology of social imperialism arose out of on the one hand the anxieties and fears of
the middle class in the 1880s confronted by the long depression and the rising tide of
working-class discontent and militancy which erupted in 1886-7; on the other
through the growing awareness during the 1880s and 1890s that British economic
supremacy was being increasingly challenged by Germany and the United States, at
almost every point. His links with Toynbee and Goschen brought Milner to the
centre of those most concerned with the situation both at home and abroad.
Moreover, they were to influence his outlook on South Africa profoundly, both in
his determination to maintain what was termed 'British supremacy' — a formula we
must come back to — in the run-up to the South African war, and in the way in
which he tackled the establishment of a new state in South Africa after the war.
There were more immediate ways in which these linkages were important to
Milner's position on South Africa in the 1890s, and our analysis of the origins of the
South African war. Since JA Hobson's The War in South Africa (1900), much ink
has been spilt by historians arguing this vexed issue with varying degrees of
plausibility and success. The most recent of these has been Alan Jeeves, who has
attempted in his important article 'The Rand Capitalists and the Coming of the
South African War, 1896-1899*. to bring together the two existing strands in the
debate.[18] While he accepts the conventional wisdom that the war was Milner's
war, fought to maintain imperial dominance in southern Africa (at risk because of
the new power of the South African Republic under Kruger to attract all Afrikaners
into a republic outside of British control, which in turn would threaten the vital
sea-route to India — the Robinson and Gallagher thesis), he argues that the war was
only possible because Milner was joined by powerful allies from within South
Africa: the mine magnates. Briefly he sees their reasons as a desire to end the
uncertainty wrought by imperial inlerventionism in South Africa, and the Repub-
lic's decision to impose fresh taxation on the industry, and (he apparent connivance
" i v ' v S w f• •'•
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of the Kmger regime in the campaign being mounted by the ami-capitalist
newspaper, the Standard and Diggers Ne*s, to play upon white working-class
reseniment.
This argument does not go far enough in its analysis either of imperial interests
in the late 19th century, or of the motives the magnates had for war. Nor does it
perceive the connection which we believe existed between the two. Indeed it is one of
the major weaknesses of the literature on late-nineteenth-century imperialism that
the notion of 'imperial interests* is rarely examined, and the rhetoric about 'British
supremacy* is taken at its face value.
None of the imperial statesmen who used the term in the late 19th cenlury saw
any need to spell out exactly what they meant by British supremacy in South Africa,
and indeed they would probably have incorporated a number of divergent if not con-
tradictory strands within the somewhat vague concept for which they were nonethe-
less in the South African case fully prepared, i f all else failed, to go to war. This does
not, however, let the historian of f the hook. We need at least to try to tease out some
of the embedded implications of the 'New Imperialism* of the late 19th century, even
though here we can do no more than examine what seem to us, in the South African
context, some of the most obvious components. Fundamental to Britain's position in
the late 19th century was its place at the heart of the international money market. As
Eric Hobsbawm has pointed out, at the very time that Britain was faced with the
intractable problems of modernizing its industry in the face of American and German
competition and its own falling productivity, it was able to find in the 'New Imperial-
ism' a cheaper and more convenient alternative, at least temporarily:[19J
To retreat into her satellite world of formal and informal colonies, to rely on her
growing power as the hub o f international lending, trade and settlements,
seemed all the more obvious a solution because, as it were, it presented i tsel f . . .
In essence what happened, therefore, was that Britain exported her immense
accumulated historic advantages in the underdeveloped world as the greatest
commercial power, and as the greatest source of loan capi ta l . . .
This position as the centre of the world's money market depended in the final
analysis on Britain's unique financial institutions, and on an international trading
currency — sterling — whose importance was assured by the preparedness of the
British banking institutions to defend it with gold. Yet the precarious ness of
Britain's gold reserve was only too starkly revealed at the very time of the major
gold discoveries on the Rand, when in 1890 Baring Brothers, the most powerful of
the British merchant banks, threatened to collapse, and was only rescued by the
decisive action of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord Goschen, and the
Governoi of the Bank of England. From this time on, in a period when most of the
remaining countries of the world were attempting successfully or unsuccessfully to
transfer to gold-based currencies, there was concern in the city of London about the
very narrowly-based nature of the British gold reserves. At the same time, from 1896
onwards, the increased economic expansion in world trade led elsewhere to an
expansion in the supply of money and, as the economist de Cecco has pointed out,
therefore a demand for 'an unceasing supply of gold and a standard policy (by these
countries) to defend their existing gold stock from calls made on it from abroad*.
With the concentration of gold in the vaults of central banks, moreover, gold
reserves become 'a piece in the international power game, a mythical symbol*; and
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their decrease is seen as a sign of financial insecurity a'nd financial weakness. 'This*,
he continues, 'is exactly why monetary authorities, during our two decades (1896-
1914) could not tolerate any reduction in their gold reserves and tried (in best
mercantilist fashion) to boost them by all available means*.[20] The transformation
of the international monetary system into a gold exchange standard which took
place during this period was therefore of the utmost importance lo those statesmen
concerned with Britain's imperial position. It could hardly have been lost on Lord
Milner, with his close friendship with Goschen (himself a merchant banker of some
renown) and afier his own career at the centre of the British financial establishment.
Although after the Baring crisis the Bank of England doubled its gold reserves to
reach £49 million in 1896, repayment of the Chinese war indemnity (1896-8) reduced
them to nearer £30m. This was of particular concern with the switch in India to a gold
standard and the increasing clamour there for a gold currency. Significantly among
the papers of Patrick Duncan, Milner's Private Secretary at the Inland Revenue
Board (1894-7) and later Treasurer of the Transvaal (1901-3) is a file devoted to the
Indian gold currency controversy in the '90s — of moment to financiers and imperial
strategists alike. By 1899 it seemed the Bank would give way to Indian demands, and
throughout the spring and summer of 1899 British financiers were calling for an
increase in the gold reserve — and it was the theme of the Chancellor of the
Exchequer's speech to the Lord Mayor's Banquet that year. This is not necessarily to
say that the Bank of England itself saw matters this way; indeed it seems that the Bank
was satisfied it could control reserves by manipulating the discount rate. Nevertheless,
in a period of increasing international political and economic insecurity, there were
powerful voices in the city who saw the position of the gold reserves as a very major
concern. By October, Britain, 'the leading monetary power in the world* was at war
with the South African Republic, *a country producing the greater proportion of the
world's supply of gold', a truly 'exceptional circumstance* as the November Bankers'
Magazine ingenuously noted.[21]
We are not of course arguing that insecurity over the gold reserve was what pushed
Britain into war in 1899. A complex number of factors combined to make war seem
increasingly the way forward. As van Helten shows, the squeeze on British manufac-
turing markets was also significant, and undoubtedly insecurity over the future of the
sub-continent played its part.(22] Yet none of these had the same force as insecurity
over the mining industry, and in the tense period of the 1890s imperial statesmen could
not afford to run the risk that the future of the South African industry would be
jeopardised by a regime which it believed — rightly or wrongly — was incapable of
securing the long-term interests of the mines, and which might well ally itself with
Britain's rivals.
Gold, we should add, was not only seen as essential for international trade, but it
was also regarded as the ultimate military defence of all the European continental
powers. With gold they could secure the provisions and weapons of war when all else
failed. The 'warchests' held by France, Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Russian
Empire all exceeded British holdings of gold. But unlike Britain the European
powers did not permit the more or less free flow of gold. Britain was alone in not
having a war chest. The true significance of having a 'friendly' government in power
in South Africa can best perhaps be seen on the outbreak of World War I, when,
according to Arndt, the government of South Africa immediately:
called a conference of bankers, mining houses and merchants. Following the
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conference, negotiations were completed between the Bank of England and the
Union Government by which the Bank would take over the entire gold output of
South Africa on behalf of the British Government. The local banks were to make
advances to the mines upon the deposit of gold with the Union Government. The
banks in turn were to obtain the equivalent from the Bank of England in
London. [23]
Under the circumsiances, Le May's remark thai "Chamberlain and Milner when they
pushed Kruger into war were not thinking of gold-fields but of the political
supremacy of Britain in South Africa' begs the question. His notion that Milner,
'for alt his remarkable abilities as a financial administrator' did not 'possess a grasp
of the submerged implications of economic theory' is unhelpful and arises from the
reading of voluminous but narrowly-conceived sources.[24]-
III
In their anxiety to escape the allegedly crude and mechanical interpretations of
Hobson in The War in South Africa, on the one hand, and to rescue the Afrikaner
state from accusations that it was 'a medieval race oligarchy' incapable of meeting
the demands of the mining industry on the other,I25] the historians have thrown out
the baby with the bathwater. Instead of trying to see what both sets of antagonists
were saying behind the rhetoric, they have substituted a rarified interpretation of
historical events based on the whims and fancies of individuals.
When Milner was appointed High Commissioner of South Africa, the South
African Republic was already the single largest producer of gold in the world — pro-
viding between a fifth and a quarter of the world's supply. Of the gold produced in
the Transvaal, about 50 per cent was produced by a single group of companies—
Wernher-Beit and Eckstein[26] — and about a half of the remaining 50 per
cent was produced by Rhodes's Consolidated Gold Fields and George Farrar's
Anglo-French Company, which in addition had very close ties with Wernher-Beit
and Eckstein — or as it was popularly known, Corner House. As we shall see, it was
no coincidence that it was the leading members of these three groups who were
largely responsible for the 'Jameson Raid* (the abortive coup against the South
African Republic at the end of 1895, led by Rhodes's lieutenant, Leander Starr
Jameson); for the agitation leading up to the South African war—and for the
importation of Chinese labour after the war, a point to which we will return.
Historians have made much of the fact that there were always divergent views
expressed within the mining industry: some have attempted to explain these in terms
of the differences in national ownership, others, following the pioneering work of
Geoffrey Blainey, in terms of the difference in interest between deep-level and
outcrop mining groups.127)
Attempts to topple Blainey's edifice have certainly knocked one or two holes in
the fabric of his argument. Nevertheless, as Richard Mendelsohn points out in a
fresh look at the arguments on both sides, the fundamental point made by
Blainey — that the Jameson Raid was mounted for very specific economic reasons,
and that the distinction between those who participated and those who did not has to
be sought in their different economic interests—has survived. [28] We are not
concerned here with the Jameson Raid — and unfortunately Mendelsohn does not
extend his scope beyond the Raid —nevertheless, we would extend his findings in
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respect of the Raid both to the war and to thc major divisions in the reconstruction
period. That is, the chief difference between the conspirators and those who stood
outside the conspiracy was that
the former were committed by 1895 [a key dale by all accounts] to long-range
mining programmes while the latter were either preoccupied with stock jobbing
or were content with modest holding operations. This meant that the conspira-
tors stood to gain far more over the long-term than Ihe rest from the replace-
ment of a self-willed and frequently obstructive Boer government by one more
easily manipulated by the mining industry. [29]
Mendelsohn's conclusions arise from his looking again and sceptically at the views
of the historians about the political motivation of Rhodes and the psychological
motivation of Alfred Beit for engaging in the Raid. As he points out, the usual
explanations in terms of Beit's dependence on Rhodes seem 'unlikely in view of
Beit's very skilful and highly successful pursuit of his financial self-interest over the
years'; a man of his position is unlikely to have so forgotten himself that 'he joined
the conspiracy without fully first considering its economic implications and the
possible financial advantages it offered his firm... '(30) The recently published
correspondence of the magnates Percy FitzPatrick and Lionel Phillips[31] both
clearly reveal that it was above all the Wernher-Beit and Eckstein companies who
saw the necessity of forging the closest links with the imperial power, in their efforts
to secure change in the South African Republic. The extent of their power and
influence has until quite recently been neglected by historians preoccupied with the
much more politically colourful and histrionic Rhodes: though there were observers
at the time like John X Merriman, later to become Prime Minister of the Cape, who
perceived clearly enough the overwhelming economic preponderance of this single
partnership.[32]
It would be advisable to recall some of the dimensions of this power before we
take too seriously the views of RV Kubicek, the major economic historian of this
period, about the dependence of the mining houses on the state after the war, and the
'failures' of Wernher-Beit and Company as a result of their involvement in imperial
politics: he concludes a recent article for example on 'Finance Capital and South
African Goldmining 1886-1914' by asserting that 'the Randlords' quest for wealth
would have been better served by cultivating international investors than British
imperialists'.[33] We believe this encapsulates a fundamental misconception about
the nature of the relationship between the state and capital, a point to which we will
return. It also effectively blurs the extent of Wernher-Beit domination in South
Africa in the 1890s and 1900s. Before the war, as we have seen, they were
producing something like 50 per cent of the total output of the Rand. According to
the group's historian, AP Cartwright, by J910:
the group might well have claimed that it was the fifth province of the Union of
South Africa. The combined budget of Wernher-Beit and Company, Eckstein
and Company and the Central Mining and Investment Corporation was bigger
than that of either Natal or the Orange Free State. Its mining organisation on the
Rand was the biggest industry in the country employing more men and certainly
producing bigger profits than the amalgamated railways and harbours of the
four provinces.[34]
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Apart from its interest in the gold-mining industry and its large stake in the
diamond monopoly, de Beers, ii was the largest land-owner in the country; it was a
large shareholder in the South African National Bank, the Pretoria Portland
Cement Company, the Argus Printing Works and the Cape Times, and had
investments in various forms of urban development and transport as well as in the
coal mines of Natal, Swaziland and the Transvaal.(35] With its millions invested in
South Africa, ii is not surprising that the leading Directors of Corner House should
have felt an acute concern with the nature of political developments in South Africa,
especially the Transvaal, both before and after the war; what is surprising, perhaps,
has been how long historians have obscured this and misconceived its nature.
As the first major company to recognise the potential of the deep-level mines on
the Witwatersrand and to pioneer their development, Wernher-Bek were, from the
early 1890s, aware of the need for state assistance on a large scale if they were to
solve the economic and technical problems involved in this new form of mining,
with its vast capital costs and its insatiable demand for a labour supply which the
South African Republic was unable to meet. The decision to mine not only
deep-level mines but low-grade ores made the issue of costs quite central to the
major groups,[36] and it is clear that this decision had been taken by 1895. Although
the mining magnates through the 1890s had their links with the Kruger government
and had perforce to seek state assistance at a variety of levels,I37] in general they
found this woefully wanting. To our mind, this constituted the crisis of the 1890s for
the mine magnates and is the key to understanding both the Raid and the war.
At the end of the 19th century, a peculiar disjuncture existed between the enclave
capitalist mode of production based upon the most advanced and sophisticated
technology and huge concentrations of European finance capital (which arose quite
dramatically and suddenly in the middle of the veld of the Transvaal as a result of
the mineral discoveries), and political/state power which remained in the hands of
Afrikaner notables, themselves largely dependent on their landholdings.[38] The
form of the slate in the late-nineleenth-ceniury Transvaal still reflected the
preindustrial agrarian society of the Afrikaners, and the sudden intrusion of masses
of capital and the demands of development were not, in the first instance, unlike the
effects of multinational corporations on third-world countries today. Although
Kruger tried, through his concession policies, to create an independent industrial
base,[39] in fact these attempts simply led to an increase in the possibilities of
-corruption of the small bureaucracy emerging out of the class of notables, most
members of which still retained the ideology, lifestyle and kinship obligations of the
earlier agrarian mode of production. Although there were very real signs in the
1890s that the South African Republic was capable of 'reform*, that is, 'moderni-
zing*, and that individual Afrikaners were undoubtedly making the transition to
capitalism,[40] it was an earlier entrepreneurial and individualistic form of capital-
ism which was remote from the world demanded by the new concentration of
economic power on the Rand, and the demand of the mining magnates for a new
form of centralized and effectively coercive state apparatus.
Through the 1890s the demands which the major mining houses were making on
the Kruger republic really added up to this. In 1895 Jameson's abortive raid was
designed to substitute a different political authority over the Transvaal. Once that
desperate attempt had failed both the imperial authorities and the mineowners
determined that any attempts to bring about internal reforms, whether they were
to be peaceful or not, would need a mass basis to be effective. Hence their
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support for ihe South African League with its programme of radical reform under
British supervision. There were, of course, moments when ii appeared as if the
impetus for reform was coming from within the Afrikaner ruling class in the
republic. Much, for example, has been made of the Report of the 1897 Industrial
Commission headed by one of the most influential of Afrikaner leaders, Schalk
Burghers, Milner read the report with enthusiasm; "it shows a breadth of view, a
liberality of judgement, and a force of expression, which, if of genuine Boer origin,
give me quite a new idea of the mveau mfe/tecmd (inlellectual level) of the Boer'(41]
His enthusiasm was misplaced. The republic, lacking the expertise to deal with the
complex technical and financial questions, had been provided with advisors by the
mining industry and as the British agent in Pretoria soon informed Milner, the
report was the work of'the mining industry'.[42) The public mood for most of 1897
among the Uillanders was, however, one of optimism about the possibilities of
reform. The manifest inability of the republic to implement the Commission's
report, and the reelection of Kruger in the 1898 presidential election, led to the
renewed agitation which was to lead uliimately to the declaration of war in 1899.
Although much of the rhetoric before the war focussed on the rights of the
Uitlanders, ('outlanders' or non-Afrikaner whites) in the South African Republic,
who were aliens excluded from citizenship, a rhetoric necessary as both Chamberlain
and to a lesser extent Milner realised, if the movement for reform and possibly war
were to be justified both to the British public and world opinion — most historians
are agreed that Kruger was right when he burst out at the Bloemfoniein Conference
(May 1899) that it was not the franchise but his stale that the British wanted. It is the
recognition by Milner and others that Kruger was unable to provide the kind of state
which the mine magnates needed if they were to run an efficient capitalist
undertaking in the Transvaal, that we see as lying behind the alarums and excursions
of these years. 143] There is no indication at the outset that Milner and Chamberlain
had a clear conception of precisely what this would mean. Indeed, it is somewhat
surprising, indeed alarming, to find, as late as September 1899, that Chamberlain
was still hazy about precisely what should be demanded from the Boers — apart
from a general recognition of British suzerainty.[44]
Yet if Chamberlain and Milner were satisfied before the war with the rhetoric of
vaguely defined phrases about suzerainty, the mine magnates had a far clearer
perception of their interests. Certainly the historian has to take care in reading the
words of the Randlords, many of which undoubtedly were designed to sway the
British public, the share market or the Colonial Office. Nevertheless, it would be
foolhardy to ignore the very hardheaded evidence given for example by the mining
engineers of the Chamber of Mines to the 1897 Transvaal Industries Commission.
Most interesting from this point of view was the far-reaching evidence submitted by
one William Hall, State Engineer for the State of California, who had been brought
by the major mines on the Central Rand to advise them on problems of water
supply.
Hall was one of a very large number of American mining engineers working on
the Witwatersrand in the 1890s. By 1895 at least half of the new gold mines were
managed by Americans and the chief engineers of both the Wernher-Beit gFOup and
Rhodes's Consolidated Gold Fields, were Americans.[45] These engineers had not
only had wide experience in the American West, Latin America, and Asia, but
contemporaries saw them as a 'new industrial intelligentsia, standing between
capital and labour and peculiarly fitted to resolve the nation's social conflicts'.
R1 '
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Engineers in America were in the forefront of the opposition to 'partisan* 'corrupt'
and 'inefficient' government. Above all they sought the interventionist state of the
'experts*.(46] Transported to South Africa they very quickly became critics of the
inefficiency of the Transvaal government 'the dynamite monopoly, the necessity of
bribery, and the general inability of the Boers to understand capitalism, industriali-
zation and progress'.[47]
Hall saw the crucial importance to the mining industry of bringing down the cost
of reproducing its labour force if the low grade mines were to be developed — some-
thing which became a priority from the mid-1890s. His recommendations thus went
all the way from suggesting the need for increasing the population through
immigration, improved farming methods to reduce the cost of food, afforestation
and improved transport, to ideas aboul sewage disposal and water supplies. Like
other witnesses before him, he pointed out the very low proportion of married men
in the white work force, which he attributed to the high cost of living in the
Transvaal. This in turn he related to the inadequacies of local agricultural
production: its methods he said were wasteful and the market price of produce
'excessively high'. 'How' he asked, Ms it possible under such conditions to bring
down the cost of mining the Rand to what it should be?*[48J
At the same time, Hall showed the connections between the state of agriculture
and the general administrative problems in the Republic:
If the present system of administering government affairs should be kept up, it
would take a very large proportion of able-bodied burghers of the Republic
simply to administer the laws. This could not be, and at the same time establish a
revenue system which would relieve the mining industry and permit the develop-
ment contemplated. The expense of the administration would advance propor-
tionately to the development and would arrest progress. Moreover the advanced
agriculture necessary to advance the mining industry could not itself be accom-
plished were the burghers nearly all occupied in public service... [49]
Three conclusions he thus found unavoidable:
! The burgher population must increase proportionately even more rapidly than
the mining population;
2 the administration of laws on the Rand must be greatly changed; or
3 there can be no very great advance, no matter what reliefs be granted in the
way of cheaper dynamite and cheaper transportation, and grievances will
continue to exist.
He concluded:
The administration of kaffir labour and of all mine labour matters.. . will have
to be left to mine managements under some Government law, which would make
all of them come in and stay in it for their own good. . . The anomalous
condition of 50,000 to 70,000 while people and 250,000 blacks, including city
populations massed in a limited area and wholly governed and kept in order,
even as to local matters by guards and administrative officers drawn from a
sparse agricultural population cannot be made to work.150]
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Given the very clear perception and breadth of the demands which were being made
there was no way in which Kruger could produce the reforms demanded without
giving away, as he realised, 'his state'. What is striking is to find that it was these
recommendations of the mining engineers of 1897 which were translated into
practice by the social engineers of the post-war period. Almost all of Milner's
policies, most of them conceptualised and defended by him in terms of 'racial'
politics (that is Boer-British numerical balances) such as immigration, land settle-
ment schemes, and so on, were foreshadowed in Hall's evidence. Not always of
course in their finest detail: policy has to be implemented in a real world of conflict
and competition. And the real world had been dramatically changed by the
disruption, destruction and bitterness created by the war. In some respects the
economic conditions which came with the peace were notably different to those
which existed before the war. The price of gold, when measured against the cost of
stores, fell between 1899 and 1908, and while speculative capital, which had been an
essential part of the mining industry before the South African war, made one brief
appearance, in 1903, it then shied away from the goldfields.[51] Nevertheless the one
overriding anxiety of the mining houses remained: the widespread existence of low
grade ore which could only be mined if the whole cost structure of the industry was
significantly changed. Still in a number of areas the mine magnates were making
demands of the state which Kruger could not fulfil — and which, despite their
short-term disagreements with the reconstruction regime[52] Milner was bent on
securing. As important was that Milner's successors, first Lord Selborne,[53] and
then more significantly the Afrikaner-led cabinet of the self-governing Transvaal,
[54] were equally determined to maintain these essential conditions in which the
mining industry could thrive.
There is not space here to elaborate on these at any length. Let us simply set out
the demands of the pre-war period and then look at some of the most crucial
changes inaugurated during the reconstruction period. Foremost among the
demands was the call for the transformation of the machinery of state; for a modern
bureaucracy, particularly a Native Affairs Department, an effective police force and
an uncorrupt judiciary. Next was the call for the elimination of the concessions
policy and the operation of free trade with reduction and elimination of tariffs.
Third, there were the calls for the mechanisms to control and direct labour. Fourth,
there was the need to ensure the reproduction of the work force both black and
white, and associated with this the need to reduce the cost of essential foodstuffs,
housing, and to ensure health and sanitation. Fifth, the magnates themselves sought
a ring-keeper who would reduce and eliminate competition among themselves, and
between themselves and commercial fanning and commercial capital. Sixth, to
reinforce the coercive machinery of state and to reduce the need for it, they sought
institutions which would create ideological supports for the new economic order.
These included a compliant press as well as a suitably adapted educational system.
The reform of the educational system, we should add, was essential if the
stabilization as well as the reproduction of the white working class was to be
achieved.
Of these, the most readily remedied, and certainly amongst the most publi-
cized grievances, related to Kruger's concessions policies, in particular the dynamite
monopoly and the railway concession granted to the Netherlands South Africa
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Rhindividual capitalists were not averse to making the most of the conces-
- w h i l e they existed, in the overall interest of accumulation, what the magnates
wanted was the esiablishment of conditions for the free movement of goods within
the region. Hence their opposition to the concessions policy; hence their interest in
unification.
Far more complex and related to most other aspects of policy were the labour
needs of the mines; indeed these can be seen as the most important demands
being made by the industry upon the stale. Paradoxically this issue was not only
the one in which the Kruger regime seemed both unable and unwilling to assist the
mining companies, but it also revealed the companies' need to have a strong state to
prevent their setting their own short-term interests against the long-term interests of
the industry. Hall, it will be remembered, had argued that on the matter of labour
recruiting what was required was a law 'which would make all of them come in and
stay in it for their own good*. This observation was born of the experience of the
1890s when attempts by the Chamber of Mines to coordinate recruiting, impose a
maximum average wage and prevent the poaching of labour from one mine to the
next constantly broke down. The same problem was to recur after the war, when the
magnates — Wernher-Beit in particular — appealed for state intervention to impose
some uniform action on the industry's labour recruiting policies. As had been the
case before the war, the Robinson group had broken rank with the mine-owners*
recruiting organisation, the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA),
threatening as a result to raise the price of labour. The most striking testimony to the
effectiveness of the reconstruction regime came after responsible government had
been established, when in 1908 the Minister of Mines in the first Transvaal cabinet,
Jacob de Villiers, and Jan Smuts (who had been Kruger's Attorney-General and was
later to be Prime Minister of South Africa) helped pave the way for a reconciliation
between the Robinson group and the Wernher-Beit Company. 'I shall be only too
delighted' wrote the Wernher-Beit group's leading spokesman, Lionel Phillips, 'if I
can arrange something by which peace is restored and unity of action once more
secured. Smuts and de Villiers both urged me to go and see Robinson; the former
said "I believe if you would go and see the old man you could smooth over all the
difficulties.'"156] As a result of the Botha government's efforts the Robinson
Group rejoined the Chamber of Mines in September 1907 and WNLA in January
1908. Smuts drafted the terms of the settlement and Selborne concluded a despatch
on the matter by noting that his government had 'arranged to keep a general control
over the work of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association'.[57J
So pressing had been the Chamber of Mines' demands for labour before the war
that the liberal anti-imperialist JA Hobson was persuaded that Britain's war aim
could be reduced to the 'one all-important object' of securing 'a full, cheap, regular,
submissive supply of Kaffir and white labour*.[58] Given the suddenness and speed
with which the mining industry grew up, it needed a state to create its proletariat,
very unlike the situation in the older industrial societies, although not unlike that in
the twentieth-century colonial world. From the point of view of the Chamber of
Mines, the weaknesses of the Kruger administration related to its inability to enforce
controls over the drunkenness and desertion of the existing work force, to impose a
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On every one of these issues, the Milner regime took action in the post-war period,
with a greater or lesser degree of success. Sometimes it was a matter of administering
existing laws more efficiently (as with pass laws or prohibition); more often it
involved large-scale social engineering.
One of the most dramatic examples of social engineering, as Peter Richardson's
work has shown, involved the securing of a huge army of Chinese workers. This in
spile of the fact, realised at the time, thai the Chinese labour policy threatened to
jeopardise what have conventionally been seen as Milner's political objectives.
Chinese workers were required to replace Africans who resisted post-war attempts
both to reduce their wages and to have imposed upon them new technology and
production routines. These had become necessary if the mines were to make use of
low grade ore to which they had committed themselves in their pre-war speculative
operations. Employing Chinese workers involved, between 1903 and 1907, the huge
task of recruiting 60,000 men and transporting them 12,000 miles to the Wilwaters-
rand. In the short term they added to the cost structure, yet by substituting Chinese for
cheaper black labour it became possible to work lower grade ore and still make a
profit. Chinese labour was more expensive because the combined cost of recruiting,
transport, wages, food, social infrastructure and accommodation exceeded the cost
of African labour.[59]
There were, however, a number of conditions which contributed to the greater
profitability of Chinese labour power. To begin with they were contracted for much
longer periods than African workers, three years against six months. Because they
were on the mines for this much longer period they were able to acquire the skill and
experience to use the more efficient hand drill rather than the compressed air drill
used by the short-term African workers. The hand drill permitted much narrower
stopes — the work place from which ore is extracted — reducing working costs and
enabling the companies to mine much lower grades of ore than had been economi-
cally possible before the South African War. This was because essential to narrow
sloping and hand drilling was an additional degree of coercion which was absent
from the relationship even between African workers and mine management.
Short-term African workers resisted the unpleasant and arduous conditions of hand
drilling by the simple expedient of desertion. The inadequate policing of the South
African Republic could do little to stop this. Chinese workers, who were banned
from working outside of the mine to which they were assigned, let alone outside
mining, were confronted by the more thoroughgoing police force of the new regime.
The greater coercion provided by the new state as well as the inability of the Chinese
workers to find refuge beyond the purpose-built mine compounds, meant that they
had little alternative but to remain at their place of work.[60]
This coercion also meant that their labour could be distributed in a more rational
way and they were systematically sent to the working (rather than the developing)
mines of the more profitable groups, who in practice controlled the Chinese labour
schemes.[61] But it was not only the new effectiveness of the state in the Transvaal
which made it possible to employ Chinese labour profitably. It was also its capacity
to call on the Imperial state to negotiate Chinese recruitment.[62] Not only could the
South African Republic not have undertaken the international negotiations itself; it
is also doubtful whether it could have placated white public opinion. (It should,
however, be noted that opposition to Chinese labour brought the former Boer
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generals 10 create a populisi Afrikaner organisation, Hei Votk (The People). With
this development British strategy for incorporating the citizens of the ex-republics
changed and eventually internal self-government was conceded to them.[63)) The
impact of Chinese labour on the working conditions of the Transvaal mines
outlasted their presence. African workers, reduced in importance for almost five
years, found their bargaining power undermined when economic necessity returned
them to the lower wages and more difficult working conditions which had, by 1908,
become the norm.J64J Moreover, the success of Chinese labour, shortlived as it was,
was not only to undermine the bargaining position of black workers but also to
ensure (notwithstanding the high rate of white unemployment on the Rand at the
time, and Milner*s desire to swamp Afrikaners demographically) that while workers
would not be used in unskilled non-supervisory work. For ideological justification
Milner turned to the arguments of the eugenics movement to bolster his case:
Our welfare depends upon increasing the quantity of our white population, but
not at the expense of its quality. We do not want a while proletariat in this
country. The position of the whites among the vastly more numerous black popu-
lation requires that even their lowest ranks should be able to maintain a standard
of living far above that of the poorest section of the population of a purely white
country... However you look at the matter, you always come back to the
same root principle—the urgency of that development which alone can make
this a white man's country in the only sense in which South Africa can become
one, and that is, not a country full of poor whites, but one in which a largely
increased white population can live in decency and comfort. That development
requires capital, but it also requires a large amount of rough labour. And that
labour cannot to any extent, be white, if only because, pending development and
the subsequent reduction in the cost of living, white labour is much loo dear. [65]
The mine-owners were equally clear that a mass substitution of white for black
unskilled labour was unacceptable, and this for two related reasons. The majority of
the Afrikaner unemployed in the towns were seen as unacceptable because they were
too proletarianized. Unlike the Africans they might have replaced they were
landless, and the wage they required had to provide not only for their own keep but
also for their families* subsistence and reproduction. Nevertheless, some of the
earliest Afrikaner miners were, like their African counterparts, migrant labour-
ers.[66] In the months immediately after the war, however, when they were faced
with a great shortage of labour, and at the same time, with large numbers of
unemployed white workers in the towns,[67J the Johannesburg representatives of
the mining companies contemplated the use of a limited number of unskilled white
workers. The London principals warned against their employment and Percy Fitz-
Patrick writing to Julius Wernher in London, assured him that he recognised
as a cardinal and acknowledged fac t . . . the appalling position that we should be
in if we were to work towards Mr Seddon's New Zealand ideal or the 'working
man's paradise' and have this industry throttled by labour unions. I never for
one moment forget this danger Nothing will persuade me that white labour
can displace black here.. . [68]
But even if white labour were not to displace black, it could not itself be
k (The People). With
is of the ex-republics
ed 10 them. (6:1]) The
the Transvaal mines
ance for almost five
nic necessity returned
; which had, by 1908,
, shortlived as it was,
workers but also to
I on the Rand at the
y) thai white workers
;ological justification
bolster his case:
vhite population, but
ite proletariat in this
lumerous black popu-
) maintain a standard
lion of a purely white
s come back to the
hich alone can make
h Africa can become
ie in which a largely
rt. That development
igh labour. And that
ling development and
is much too dear.[65]
>n of white for black
ions. The majority of
ble because they were
replaced they were
>r their own keep but
theless, some of the
irts,-migrant labour-
-hen they were faced
th large numbers of
rg representatives of
>er of unskilled white
mem and Percy Fitz-
at he recognised
on that we should be
ideal or the 'working
r unions. I never for
ne that white labour
could not itself be
Lord Milner and the South African Stale 67
dispensed with. And this posed a danger which had been revealed by the w eakness of
the Kruger state. This was seen most dramatically when in 1897 the Robinson group
of mines declared a lock-out against their own men — an action they felt themselves
more capable of undertaking than the other mining groups because they were less
concerned with maintaining cross-class Uitlander unity in the face of the Afrikaner
state —and found themselves at the mercy of strikers who destroyed extensive
company property because the South African Republic's police could not hope to
protect the far-flung mines.[69) In the pre-war period anti-capitalist feelings among
white workers were extremely strong. Percy FilzPatrick, we now know, wrote
sombrely of "the bitterness of feeling and the distrust of the capitalists which obtain
here*.[70] The need to defuse this hostility was doubly necessary because after the
failure of the Jameson Raid both the British government and the mine magnates
recognised that any future attempt to confront the Kruger regime would have to
have the mass support of the working class. The South African League, which was
brought into existence in 1897, was an attempt to build a political coalition upon a
working class base. Because substantial parts of the working class and the immigrant
petty bourgeoisie were significantly threatened by the South African Republic's
policies, the League's programme drew a sympathetic response. [71] Nevertheless the
Kruger regime also attempted to obtain working class support, and the subsidy it
provided for the Standard <£ Diggers News was the source of that paper's anti-
capitalist posture.
When the war was over the British army, the local town police, and soon the
Union Defence Force (that is the South African army) would safeguard mining
property. But this defence was poorly undertaken if left only to the coercive powers
of the state. The incorporation of white workers was essential if the new state was to
ensure that capitalist property relations would go unchallenged. Equally both the
Afrikaner party, Het Volk, and the rival political associations, representing the mine
owners (Piogressive Association) and the commercial and professional middle
classes (Responsible Government Association) saw the need to get white working
class support.172] The result, when responsible government was finally conceded to
the Transvaal, was a franchise which admitted virtually all adult white males. If
white workers were not subjected to the same degree of exploitation as were black
workers, this was because their manifest capacity for militant action was both feared
and where necessary deferred to.
At the same lime the anti-capitalist class consciousness of white workers had to be
blunted by other means. Before the war the mine-owners had seen the Standard &
Diggers News as a major source of working class mistrust and antagonism. They had
also known that a hostile state could both foster (with subsidies) newspapers
sympathetic to it, and close down, or at least interrupt, the printing of those to
which it was hostile. Now the situation was reversed. Not surprisingly the Standard
and Diggers News was closed down with the British occupation of Johannesburg in
19OO.[73] Under the new order the press was to help create those attitudes to mining
property which would make the white working class accept them as legitimate. The
Star had been the magnates* main newspaper before the war, but partly because of
ineptitude, partly because of harassment, and no doubt largely because the Standard
and Diggers News presented a clear alternative, it was most ineffective. With the
coming of the new state the Star was given a clear run to establish its ideological
hegemony. The Star, it should be said, belonged to the Argus group of newspapers
which in their turn were a subsidiary of the Wernher-Beit group. When Basil
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Worsfold was employed by the Argus group the parent company dispensed with the
formality of separate notepaper in giving their new editor his instructions:
We do not ihink it is the wish of the Company to lay down any specific lines
upon which it is their desire that you should edit the paper referred to, but,
generally speaking, the proprietors are desirous of supporting the Imperial and
Local Governments in their work of administration in the Transvaal, and in their
general policy regarding the South African Colonies.
As you are aware, in the present condition of South Africa the Mining
Industry1 is of paramount importance, the prosperity of the country being prac-
tically dependent upon its expansion and success. You would, therefore, be
expected in general to support the policy of that Industry as formulated by the
Chamber of Mines.[74]
In spile of this brief, or because of it, Worsfold came into conflict with his employers
because he defended a series of measures taken by the administration at which his
employers in the Chamber took offence. Within a very short while he was to resign
as editor.[75]
At a whole variety of other levels, which have recently been most notably
explored by Charles van Onselen, [76] the state and the mining industry intervened in
these years to shape the geography of class on the Witwatersrand. These interven-
tions ranged all the way from transforming municipal government and fiscal policies
to housing and sewers. Most were related to the need to reduce the costs of the white
working class by stabilizing it on the Rand. Thus, among the first schemes blessed
both by Chamberlain and Milner and by the mining magnates (who with Lord
Rothschild also financially backed the scheme) was to import women domestics to
the Rand from the United Kingdom. This project had the virtue of simultaneously
'releasing' black males from domestic service to work in the mines, and of supplying
a potential source of wives for the white working class: which would both stabilize
the workforce and provide for its domestic labour needs more cheaply.[77]
One of the most important long-term interventions by the state in the period of
reconstruction was its attempt to reduce the very high death rate which resulted from
working and living on the mines. The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association
reported these deaths as 'wastage* but the Chamber moved in only in a dilatory way
to reduce this even though it was in its own interest to do so. The state to begin with
acted with some circumspection. There was no conflict between its paternalism and
its desire to reduce the mortality rate on the one hand, and on the other its promise
to shelter the industry from adverse publicity and its willingness to forgo improve-
ments in low grade mines or in mines nearing the end of their productive lives. In
spite of this* forbearance, however, the industry did little to improve conditions and
in 1905 the state found it necessary to enact the Coloured Labourers' Health
Ordinance. This prescribed minimum conditions for maintaining health in com-
pounds and gave the Native Affairs Department power to enforce compliance. (78]
A further way of cheapening the cost of labour (white as well as black) was, as
Hall had pointed out, through a transformed agriculture.[79] Again at almost every
level in agrarian society the post-war administration attempted to introduce
far-reaching changes. Not all its policies were immediately successful: war, drought
and cattle disease were obstacles. Nor can rural social relations be transformed by
administrative fiat. Yet in the long nan the intervention of the regime was to be
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decisive in a number of areas. After the war (and sometimes before it was over) the
siate made itself fell in the rural society and economy, but it was always constrained
by the need to strike a balance between economic necessity and political possibility.
Departments of state were created with Ihe specific task of directing and guiding
the rural economies to a more productive condition. Both colonies were given Land
Boards — which grew out of the exigencies of reconstruction— and these soon
became departments of land with a general responsibility for transforming the
arable and pastoral economies by advancing social, technical and scientific changes
on a scale never before envisaged in any of the states of South Africa. The Transvaal
acquired a commissioner of Lands from the Western Australian government and a
director of agriculture from the Colonial Office. Both men saw their task as
depending on the state and having long-term consequences which could not be
measured by any immediate return on the large amounts of capital being inves-
ted. (80]
If the agriculture of a country is to be developed [wrote FB Smith who came to
head the department of agriculture], it must be by radical measures... With the
exception of Great Britain where centuries of experience and enterprise of
private individuals and societies have atoned for the shortcoming of the govern-
ment . . . the condition of the agriculture of a country can be gauged with a fair
degree of accuracy by the quality of its Department of Agriculture. [81]
Science began to play a part in the agriculture of the new colonies such as had
never been possible before. We have only to compare the way in which rinderpest,
swine fever, and East Coast fever were dealt with before and after the war to
recognise that we are dealing with administrations of a qualitatively different
order.182] Yet it would be wrong to see this merely in terms of technological inputs.
For the new slate, the primary task was to transform social and political relation-
ships. To do this involved a variety of strategies, not all of which achieved the same
long-term success, but collectively they contributed to bringing a new rural order
into being. The best-known of these various schemes were the attempts to bring
English-speaking settlers to the rural Transvaal and Orange River Colony. This was
the least effective of all the attempts at social engineering and probably owed as
much to the eagerness of the land companies (many closely associated with the
mining houses) to realise at least a part of their assets, as it did to the political and
social considerations of the Milner administration. [83] But for all that the settlement
schemes did not achieve Milner's objectives, they did bring over a thousand rural
households to the new colonies, and no proper measurement has yet been made of
the effect which this had on the economy. Quite apart from the £500 on average
which each settler brought in savings, their presence also encouraged a general and
perhaps incalculable assistance to the countryside which might not otherwise have
been proffered.[84]
In seeking its economic objectives the colonial slate hastened the establishment
of local agricultural societies, setting them into being as well as financing them.
Although a few such societies existed before the war they had limited their activities
to arranging local shows. Now they joined in seeking scientific and technical
solutions to farmers* problems as well as proposing administrative and political
objectives.[85] Quarantine committees, launched to place some of the responsibility
for controlling animal diseases upon rural society, had a similar effect to the
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agricultural associations of strengthening the notables of the countryside.|86]
The condition of the rural white poor had reached a point of crisis before the
war. The government of the South African Republic had attempted to alleviate their
condition in a number of ways without being notably successful in any one of
them.[87] After the war the incoming regime inherited a situation exacerbated by
physical destruction as well as the weakening of communal obligations and
commitments. What were therefore essentially schemes for famine relief were also
seen to present the possibility of shifting political allegiances. The best-known of
these was the Burgher Land Settlements which made the white poor the 'Bijwoners
[share-croppers] of the State*.[88] It may be that these schemes failed, as Richard
Solomon, the Attorney General of the Transvaal, suggested in 1906, because unlike
the urban social change which the regime was forwarding, rural schemes had not
been studied sufficiently before being put into operation.189] There was, indeed, no
rural Toynbee Hall to use as a model. It was more likely however that the rural poor
were not transformed into sturdy yeomen because they lacked the resources essential
for rural or any other enterprises. They could claim neither capital nor labour from
the state or elsewhere, and as hardworking as the majority of participants were
(stereotypes to the contrary), the Burgher Land Settlements failed because of these
two critical shortcomings.
In any event the Burgher Land Settlements did not encompass all the poor and
the drift to the towns continued, helping to swell the ranks of the unemployed,
adding to the class of 'poor whites', 'breeding apathy, squalor, crime and discon-
tent'. This created serious anxieties about the urban stability of the Transvaal towns.
To meet such concern Lord Selbome, who replaced Milner as High Commissioner in
1905, proposed to cope with the disaffection of the poor, as well as that of the rural
propertied, by attempting to revive at least a part of their previous class structure. In
proposing a Land Bank he hoped to benefit the rural notables and to get them to
accept the status quo. But he hoped also to recreate the system of clientage which
had incorporated the white poor in an earlier period. The success of such a policy
must be judged by both its long-term as well as by its short-term results. In the long
term these poor could not be kept out of the towns and the effects of their
proletarianization would be among the most dramatic known to South African
history. Within the short term the outcome was nevertheless substantial. Het
Volk, the organization which h.ad originally emerged to meet the sharper (and on the
whole less significant demands of Milnerism) accepted the concessions of Selborne
— concessions he was able to make because he was operating in a different
context —and rather than challenging the colonial regime became the 'willing ally*
of both the mining industry and British imperialism. Yet these political and social
successes, thoughthey must be seen as preceding, are not to be separated from the
success of the botanist and the veterinary surgeon. By 1908 the new seed, new
methods of preparing the soil, inoculation, quarantining and stock improvement,
had turned the agricultural and pastoral short-falls of the decade before the war into
the surplus stocks of maize and beef of that year. The ex-republics rather than
having to find imports for the Rand markets were now forced to find export markets
for their own crops. [90]
One direction of social policy was to have very long-term and far-reaching
consequences. Milner's administration set themselves against tenancy arrangements,
whether for cash rents, sharecropping or even labour; they seemed determined to
transform all black tenants into wage labourers. Although they were arguably
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influenced by theoretical considerations about the superiority of wage labour, it is
abundantly clear that they were primarily concerned to free potential black labour
for the gold mines. It may be argued that the ex-republics had also sought to limit
tenancy arrangements, but what emerges from an examination of their anti-
squatting legislation is that the object was to redistribute labour—.an object,
however, attempted reluctantly and only in response to demands from poor farmers
for a redistribution of labour. Such attempts were resisted by the Afrikaner political
and administrative classes who had these measures foisted upon them, and it is not
surprising that the anti-squatting legislation of the republics made little headway. [91]
It was left to the South African Native Affairs Commission which in its report
drafted one of the most far-reaching schemes of social engineering, to propose the
elimination of all tenancy arrangements although it allowed labour tenancy as the
most suitable bridge to the final stage of wage labour.
If the Milner and Selborne administrations had to come to terms with the
realities of existing class relations in the countryside and worked within that
framework in relation to white farming, to some extent the evolution of a policy of •
'reserves' for African occupation, and indeed the territorial limits which were set to
the future South African union in these years, were the result of a similar interaction
between social engineering and the art of the possible. The utility of a policy
which would maintain the 'reserves' in order to subsidize the cost of reproducing a
migrant labour force was beginning to be appreciated both in official circles and in
the intellectual groups which had evolved around some of Milner's advisors. Thus
Lionel Curtis, who had been a member of the Kindergarten and was later to become
influential within British domestic politics as an ideologue of empire, brought
together a group of 'experts* to help him formulate policies for a future united
South Africa. Among these was an accountant of one of the mining groups, Howard
Pirn, who as early as 1905 put forward a schematic statement on the potential role
the reserves could play in subsidizing the true cost of the migrant's wage.
let us assume... that the white man does turn the native out of one or more of
his reserves... the native must live somewhere. We will suppose that he is moved
into locations attached to the large industrial centres — a theory of native
management which receives much support.. . In the location he is more closely
huddled together than he would be in his own country, and finds.. .himself in
surroundings in which his native customs have no place and he is compelled to
purchase from the white man the food which in his own country he raised for
himself. What the white man gains, therefore, is little more than the labour
required to pay for the food which under natural conditions the native raised for
himself... The white man has not yet shown that in South Africa his cultivation
of the simple crops which the native requires can compete with native cultivation
. . . For a lime the location consists of able-bodied people, but they grow older,
they become ill, they become disabled — who is to support them? They commit
offences—who is to control them? The reserve is a sanatorium where they can
recruit, if they are disabled they remain there. Their own tribal system keeps
them under discipline, and if they become criminals there is not the slightest
difficulty in bringing them to justice... As time goes on these location burdens
will increase and the proportion of persons in the location really able to work will
still further diminish... it is a fair assumption that at the outside one-fifth of the
location population... is able to work. This means that the wages paid by
i 1
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Ihe employers will have to be sufficient to support four other persons besides the
workman... [92)
If Pirn's position had not yet been generally accepted, the administration had
nevertheless to accept the necessity of avoiding open confrontation in the country-
de For this reason it was extremely cautious in its responses to settlers* calls for
outright expropriation of African lands in the Transvaal and Swaziland. [93]
Contemplating a more gradual process of proletarianization than the immediate
demands being made by settlers, members of the Kindergarten and others proposed
a policy based on 'territorial separation'. This was most clearly enunciated in their
far-reaching Native Affairs Commission. It was explicitly directed at formulating 'a
uniform native policy' in view of the impending unification of the southern African
territories, and aimed to produce a policy 'which would transcend Cape liberalism
and the repressive policies of the Republics.[94] In a number of spheres, but
particularly on land, its recommendations foreshadowed Union policy over the next
quarter century and more.
This should not surprise us. As Martin Legassick pointed out some time ago, it
was during the reconstruction period that many of the guidelines of twentieth-
century segregationist policies were set out, both in relation to the town and
countryside.[95] And these have to be related not only to Milner's particular
world-view, so sketchily outlined at the beginning of this paper, but also to the far
wider sets of assumptions held by the British rulers of South Africa at the beginning
of the 20th century and their interaction with local conditions. Their ideas were
drawn both from their reactions to class militancy in the United Kingdom, social
Darwinism and the eugenics movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and
from the exigencies of colour and class in the South African context. Segregation
thus posed the possibility of industrialization along lines of control while mitigating
(it was believed) the harsher effects of an industrial revolution, [96]
The new state emerged as the guarantor of property rights, recognising the need
to orchestrate economic policy, decisive in abolishing the remaining obstacles to
labour recruiting, clearsighted in perceiving that capital needed to be saved from its
own shortsighted tendency to bid up the price of labour, cognisant of the necessity
to attempt to modify the most disruptive effects of industrial development and of
having to provide efficient channels for transactions between states. In fact, in many
ways these are roles which Robin Murray has suggested are required by the modern
multinational corporation of the post-colonial state. [97] The reconstruction regime
either played a key part in meeting these conditions or prepared the way for meeting
them. The Krager regime with its different economic constituency and rationale,
might satisfy one or other of these conditions at any onetime. It could not satisfy all
of them all the time.
I
The state which was established in the last days of the war and which lasted until
Milner's departure from South Africa in 1905, was in many ways a 'conquest* state.
This gave the administration far greater powers to intervene and shape civil society
than would otherwise perhaps have been possible (though even here, as we have
seen, there were limits to the arts of the possible: South Africa was not a 'blank
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page*). Ii also meant that for the years of ihe Milner administration it had far less
'relativeautonomy* than is usual for a capitalist slate: as Donald Denoon has shown,
for example, there were far greaier linkages between the actual personnel of the min-
ing industry and the administration, and an even closer degree of day-to-day consulta-
tion between individual capitalists and departments of state than is normally found in
a 'mature' industrial state.[98] This in turn was to have deeply divisive effects on the
political community of the Transvaal, and ensured the victory of Het Volk in the 1907
elections. Nevertheless, by that stage 'reconstruction* could not be turned back. Des-
pite an initial plummeting of gold shares when news of the victory reached a despond-
ent British market,199] the mine magnates, like the Kindergarten, were soon to realise
the difference of the new dispensation. There were, moreover, advantages to be
gained for both sides. Indeed, Smuts recognised this even in February 1906, when he
approached Wernher to form an alliance on the grounds that 'their interests [were] in
so many ways identical... as large property-holders'.(100] Now Het Volk dropped its
demand for an immediate withdrawal of Chinese labour and accepted a phased and
orderly repatriation. In return the mining houses showed a willingness to employ
poor white Afrikaners.[101] In 1907 the industry felt itself able to confront the
relatively expensive English-speaking miners whose skills were becoming replaceable
or redundant. Management, therefore, raised the number of drills a white ganger
was required to supervise, and when they struck work the mining companies
responded by drawing on Afrikaners as strike breakers.[102] This was possible
because Chinese and African miners were already performing the most substantial
tasks of the mining production. The new Transvaal government feigned neutrality in
the dispute but while it went through the motions of attempting to negotiate a
settlement it called in British troops to back up the police giving protection to the
strike breakers. It also ignored the evidence that mine managers were acting
unlawfuUybyusingunlicencedmen to set off dynamite charges. [103] The strike was
quickly broken and management seized the opportunity to reduce the number of
skilled white workers and their wages. The last word can safely be left to Lionel
Phillips, Johnannesburg Director of Wernher-Beit and Eckstein, writing to Julius
Wernher shortly after the Het Volk victory and during the 1907 strike:
The whole position is really getting topsy-turvy. A Boer government calling out
the British troops to keep English miners in order while the Dutch men are
replacing them in the mines You may rest assured that we are taking every
advantage of the strike to reduce working costs as far as possible.[l04]
1 See, for example, PN Manscrgh, South Africa 1906-61: the price of magnanimity, 1962.
2 Eric Stokes, 'Milncrism', Historical Journal, V, 1966.
3 History and the Common Man, p.10.
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You know, it is such a comfort to have a little kindergarien show of dolls — all your
own, moving at your sweet wi l l , not asking inconvenient questions, not making factious
opposition, and making only so much criticism as only dear and well-meaning friends
(not sycophants) will make . . . That is the way we are ruled here by the finest flower of
Varsity scholarship.*
JC Smuts loEmily Hobhouse, 28 Feb. 1904. Selections from the Smuts Papers, eds. WK
Hancock and Jean Van der Poel, 4 vols. Cambridge 1966, p. 152.
12 As Martin Chanock has recently observed, it has become 'a Imism that Britain won ihe
war in South Africa in 1902 only to lose the peace. The bulk of historical studies of the Anglo-
South African relationship are built around this premise*. (Unconsummated Union: Britain,
Rhodesia and South Africa, 1900-1945, Manchester 1977, p. 1). Together with Chanock we dis-
agree with this premise. For Milner's own pessimism about the prospects for British hegemony in
South Africa after his departure, see W Nimocks, Milner's Young Men: the 'kindergarten' in
Edwardian imperial affairs, Durham, North Carolina 1968, pp.72-5. The kindergarten had a
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By the lime Robinson and the kindcrgarden received Milner's letter advising them to
quit 'flogging dead horses1 and concentrate instead upon 'making the best of your own
position under altered circumstances', they had, in fad become deeply involved in a
scheme which they hoped might even yet bring to fruition the Milnerian dream of a
unified South Afr ica. . .(Nimocks, p.74)
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14 Chapter IX of Imperialism and Social Reform deals with Milner as the social-imperial
idealist 'who, obviously disinterested and guided by sincere and generous sentiments... suc-
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throughout, but esp. pp.21-2, 27.
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Canadian Historical papers. 1973, pp.61-83, which summarizes much of the argument on this
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Less and less able to compete wiih ihe new workshops of the world, ihe ruling elite com-
pensated by extending control over the world's money market by building up a financial
ctnire in ihe City of London. During ihe long period during which sterling was the
world's main trading currency... these unique financial institutions remained at one
level the nucleus of world capitalism.
While we do noi defend so conspiratorial a view of the origins of these financial institutions,
iheir significance must be stressed. And in ihe S African war it seems that Britain was defending
not only her own interests but those of share capital in general. When it came lo war, the
German, French and American governments did not intervene on ihe Boer side — despite
popular sympathy with ihe Republics and a virulent anti-British press. German magnates,
French shareholders and American mining engineering interests all hoped lhat a British victory
would ensure the future of capitalist development on the Rand. See for example J-J van Helten,
'German Capital, ihe Netherlands Railway Company and the Political Economy of the
Transvaal", Journal of African History XIX, 1978, pp.386-8. 390; TJ Noer, Briton. Boer and
Yankee. The United States and S Africa. 1870-1914, Kent, Ohio 1979. chaps. 2-4 (chap. 4 is
called 'A Briiish War for American Interests*); RV Kubicek, 'Finance Capital and S African
Goldmining, 1886-1914', Journal of Commonwealth and Imperial History, III, 1975. main-
tains that French investors were, however, lo be bitterly disappointed at the outcome. See also
his Economic Imperialism in Theory and in Practice. The case ofS Africa Gold Mining Finance
1886-1914, Durham NC 1979, which appeared after this article was completed.
20 MdeCecco, Money and Empire, Oxford 1974, pp.117-8: deCecco provides the basis for
much of this interpretation. See also A JH Latham, The International Economy and the Under-
developed World 1865-1914, 1978, pp.41ff. on Ihe relation of the gold and silver standard.
21 P Trewelha's unpublished master's thesis, "The development of the world economy and
the war in S Africa', Sussex 1970. The Bank did have a number of expedients it could deploy
when the reserves fell too sharply; after reaching OOm it suddenly adopted a vigorous policy of
market control and by late summer was 'in a strong position' — ieby the start of ihe war. (See TE
Ashionand RSSayers, Papers in English Monetary History 10, 'The Bank in the Gold Market,
' 1890-1914', RLSayers, Oxford 1954, p.143.) The file on the Indian gold currency debate is in tht
Patrick Duncan papers, Jagger Library, Cape Town University, BC 294. A 38.6.1-5. There is
some evidence that (he Hie and clippings were originally Milner's, and the annotations may be in
Miiner's hand.
22 See especially his unpublished 'Milner and the Mind of Imperialism*, given to seminar on
Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries, 1978.
23 EHD Arndt, Banking and Currency Development in S Africa. 1652-1927, Cape Town
and Johannesburg 1928, p.423. See also de Cecco, Money and Empire, p.56.
24 British Supremacy in S Africa, p.8.
25 JSMarais's The Fall of Kruger's Republic, Oxford 1961, was probably the first scholarly
and influential attempt to do this. But see also HJ and RE Simons, Class and Colour in S Africa,
1850-1950, Harmondsworth 1969, p.61:
Few agrarian societies were so richly endowed or well equipped as the Transvaal for an
industrial revolution. The republic attracted educated and professional men from
Holland or the Cape Left to itself, it would have developed an efficient administra-
tion . . . A war was neither inevitable nor necessary to modernize the republic.
26 M Fraser and A Jeeves, All lhat Glittered. Selected Correspondence of Lionet Phillips,
1890-1914, Cape Town 1977. p.9. Even before their deep-levels went into production, in 1895,
10 of the group's outcrop mines produced 32 per cent of the total gold output of the Transvaal,
and distributed 45 per cent of the total dividend. R Mendelsohn, 'Blainey and the Jameson
Raid: the debate renewed*. Journal of South African Studies, VI, 1980 forihcoming.
27 CA Blainey, 'Lost Causes of the Jameson Raid', Economic History Review, XVIII,
1965; D Denoon, '"Capitalist influence" and the Transvaal government during the Crown
Colony period, 1900-06', Historical Journal, XI, 1968.
28 Mendelsohn, 'Blainey and the Jameson Raid'.
29 'Blainey and the Jameson Raid'.
30 'Blainey and the Jameson Raid*.
31 Fitzpatrick: b. S. Africa; educated in England; began work as bank clerk 1880; 1885-7
drove waggons with stores for the smaller mining camps of the Transvaal. After discovery of
gold went to Johannesburg; worked with fashionable hunting parties. His journalistic des-
criptions of his travels led H Eckstein and Co to employ him as head of their intelligence depart-
ment in 1892. In 1895 was a leading conspirator in the Jameson Raid. Partner in H Eckstein and
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Co in 1898 by which lime he was already a confidant of Sir Alfred Milner. Early in 1899 he
IOOV pan with others from the various mining companies in secret negotiations with the Kruger
government. In return for a loan which the mining houses would secure for it, the Kruger
regime would make a number of major reforms. The correspondent of the London Times was
provided by FiizPatrick with the financial assistance needed to bribe the Boer official who
leaked these confidential and delicately poised negotiations, bringing them to an end. In 1902
FiizPatrick uas elected President of the Chamber of Mines. He became a member of first the
Transvaal and then the South African Parliament. He was one of the members of the
convention which drafted the South African constitution. He wrote a number of books
including the polemic The Transvaal from Within. 1899, and the children's story Jock of the
Bushveld, 1907. Lionel Phillips was born in South Africa. He joined JB Robinson in
Kimberley in the 1870s and served him variously as editor of his newspaper, supervisor and
then manager. He acquired a certificate of membership of the Institute of Mechanical
Engineers while working for Robinson. In the 1880s he twice went bankrupt but he was able to
make use of his former connections in diamond mining to become a mine manager once more.
He participated in the amalgamation of the De Beers group working on behalf of Wernher-
Beit and Co. By 1890 he was in Johannesburg as a mining consultant for the associated H
Eckstein and Co. and was soon made a partner of that firm. In 1892 he became President of
the Chamber of Mines and was a leading conspirator in the events which led to the Jameson
Raid. He was sentenced to death but released after paying a £25,000 fine. From 1897 to 1906 he
was in London and only returned to South Africa after the reorganisation of the mining houses
he was associated with. Thereafter he played a leading role in transforming the relationship
between the mining houses and the leaders of the Afrikaner governing party. AH Duminy and
WR Guest, FiizPatrick. Selected papers, 1888-1906 Johannesburg 1976; and M Fraser and A
Jeeves, All that Glittered (see note 26 above).
32 John X Merriman, politician and later premier of the Cape, described the Jameson Raid
as 'the great conspiracy in which Milner [sic, but he presumably meant Chamberlain) was the
tool and Beit the brain, the fatuous ineptitude of Kruger the material,' Letter to Gold win
Smith, 1 Jan. 1907, Merriman Papers, cited in P Lewsen, Selections from the Correspondence
of John X Merriman, Cape Town 1966, III, p.315. Similarly, in a major letter to Leonard
Courtney which he intended for publication, Merriman referred to 'the Imperial idea* which
came into being 'as the goldfields waxed... to receive its final development at the hands of Mr
Chamberlain and Mr Beit with results that are written in blood and Tire on the face of the
unhappy country.1 (Merriman Papers, 17 Nov. 1901, cited in Lewsen, p.317.) To these
allusions, Lewsen notes,
A Beit of Wernher-Beit and Company... Rhodes's partner in De Beers and the British
South Africa Company, and his loyal —if at times timid — associate in his political
projects. Mcrriman, who knew Beit from his Kimberley days, disliked h im. . . and he
frequently overstates Beit's political initiative.
We are in broad agreement here with Mendelsohn's views cited above.
33 RV Kubicek Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, III, 1975.
34 AP Cartwright, The Golden Age: The Story of the Industrialization of South Africa
and the part played in it by the Corner House Group of Companies, Cape Town 1967.
. 35 Cartwright, Golden Age, p.18.
36 This point has now become a commonplace — see, for example, FA Johnstone, Class,
Race and Gold. A study of class relations and racial discrimination, 1976, pp.15-20. For the
additional reasons making 1895-6 a crucial turning point, see AH Jeeves, 'The control of
migratory labour on the South African Gold Mines in the era of Kruger and Milner', Journal
of Southern African Studies, II, 1975, pp.6-8, 10-12.
37 Jeeves, 'The control of migratory labour', pp.10-13.
38 STrapido, 'The South African Republic: Class formation and the slate, 1850-1900', in
Collected Seminar papers, The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries'.
Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London 1972, III; and S Trapido, 'Landlord and Tenant
in a colonial economy:the Transvaal 1880-1910', Journal of Southern African Studies, V,
1978.
39 See, for example, C van Onselen, 'Randlords and Rotgut, 1886-1903: an essay on the
role of alcohol in the development of European imperialism and southern African capitalism'.
History Workshop, 2, 1976, p.38. Trapido, 'Class formation and the state' (see note 38), p.60.
40 This, of course, is the burden of Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic, and Simons and
Simons as quoted in note 24.
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41 Milnei to Con>ngham Greene, 12 Aug. 1S97. Headlam 1, pp.82-3.
42 Marais, p. 190.
43 Cf. 'The warnings Mi C and 1 gave you about the state of public opinion here have been
abundantly justified. The publication of ihe Blue Book produced a great effect, bui noi so
great an effect as we had hoped. The idea of a war with ihe Slouih] AlfricanJ Republic) is very
disiasieful to most people. Consequenily the Cabinet have undoubtedly had to modify ihe pace
that ihey contemplaicd moving at immediately after the Bloemfontein Conference... '
Selborne lo Milncr, 25 June 1899, in Headlam I, p.445. 'And as far as home opinion is
concerned the management of the controversy has been perfect. Seeing how hopelessly the
British people were dead to the real issues four months ago, it is wonderful where they stand
today.' Miiner to Chamberlain, 27 Sept. 1899, in Headlam I, p.546.
44 See Chamberlain lo Miiner. 2 Sept. 1899. in which 'a list of things for which we might
ask is sei out in somewhat haphazard fashion*. Headlam I, p.546.
45 Noer, Briton. Boer and Yankee, p.31.
46 S Haber, Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in Ihe Progressive Era,
1890-1920. Chicago 1964, pp.9, 10, 5.5. See also Frederick William Taylor, The Principles of
Scientific Management, New York 1967 and Harry Braverman*s comments on 'Taylorism* in
Labour and Monopoly Capital: the Degradation of Work in the 20th Century, New York 1974,
pp.124-138. We are grateful to Colin Bundy for referring us lo some of this literature.
47 Noer, Briton. Boer and Yankee, p.32. li is worth remarking that while the secondary
literature on South Africa abounds with static attempts lo discover the origins of racism in the
altitudes of white miners drawn from Australia and California, there has, understandably,
been no similar atiempt to look at the role of mine managers, particularly ihose drawn from
the United States. This is probably just as well since the primary significance of this group is
not their national origin or their attitudes, but their experience of the methods and
organization of highly concentrated capital, and the way this experience was put to work in
similar conditions in the Transvaal.
48 The Mining Industry. Evidence and Report of the Industrial Commission of Enquiry,
Johannesburg 1897, esp. p.421.
49 The Mining Industry, p.428.
50 The Mining Industry, p.429.
51 SH Frankel, Investment and Return to Equity Capital in the South African Gold
Mining Industry. 1886-1965, Oxford 1967, pp.27-8; Peter Richardson, 'The recruiting of
Chinese Indentured Labour for the South African Gold-Mines, 1903-1908' Journal of African
History, XVIII, 1977, 87; Richardson, 'The Provision of Chinese indentured labour for the
Transvaal gold mines, 1903-8*. Unpublished doctoral thesis, London 1978, p.56.
52 Much is made of these disagreements by Arlhur Mawby in his 'Capital, government and
politics in the Transvaal 1900-1907', in the Historical Journal, XVIII, 1974 in order to
illustrate the independence of the administration from the mining industry. They ranged from
disagreements over the tax structure of the industry to the delimitation of Johannesburg's
municipal boundaries. Yet, we would argue, in all the cases cited, the disagreements in no way
impaired ihe continued prosperity of ihe industry as a whole, and that in many cases they were
part of the 'normal' conflict between the state anxious to secure the long-term interests of
'capital as a whole' and the immediate interests of competing capitals. As we have seen above,
William Hall was perfectly aware of this particular rote which the mining industry required of
the state.
53 Selborne had been Tory Under-Sccretary for Colonies between 1895 and 1900 and then
First Lord of the Admiralty until 1905. In sympathy with Milner's overall policy, he acknow-
ledged the importance of South Africa by giving up his post in the cabinet to become High
Commissioner.
54 Self Government with white manhood suffrage was conceded to the Transvaal in 1907.
Louis Botha, commander of ihe Boer forces in ihe Soulh African War, became the first prime
minister.
55 See also L Phillips (London) to RW Schumacher (Johannesburg) 31 December 1897:
'Reforms would, of course, cause many mine* which cannot be worked at a profit today to
return fair interest and would add greatly to the returns of the rich mines. When we realize that
a shilling saved (per ton milled] means ultimately an extra 2'/J millions [£s per annum] to a
concern like the Rand Mines, then we appreciate the significance of good and economical
management and good government... ' (Fraser and Jeeves, All that Glittered, p. 106). The
importance of the evidence given by Rand Mines (that is Wernher-Beit and Company) to the
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I ndustriesCommission cannot be exaggerated - and ii also reveals the extern to which they uere
selling ihepace in the demands being made of the Kruger government. Thus on 7 May 1897 Perc>
Fitzpatrick wrote lo Otto Beit in London:
Apart altogether from what ihe Commission may or may not achieve, 1 think that it has
done good in other ways. Ii has enabled us 10 state our case clearly... I cannot help
noting ihat it is news to men like Barnato and Robinson lhat labour forms so important
an item and that Railway Carriage adds largely to Ihe cost of equipping a mine. Also
(hat Albu never gave a thought to ihe earnings of the railway and its iniquities until he
attended the Rand Mines meeting when you may remember, he was so astonished that
he could not believe (he figures given. It is no doubt a compliment that Albu should
have based his evidence before the Commission on the Rand Mines address as did
several others, but what has surprised me a good deal is that, excepting only Farrar, all
the others here — Gold Fields [i.e. Rhodes], Robinson, Barnato, Albu, Brakhan,
Dunning and Goldmann too — seem to have failed to go below the surface of things . .
Having goi ihem lo face the dynamite, coa! and railway questions as legiiimate economic
grievances, they went quiie strong on them before ihe Commission.. .(Duminy and
Guest, Filzpatrick, p. 101.)
56 L Phillips (Johannesburg) to Julius Wernher (London), 25 Feb. 1907, in Frazer and
Jeeves, p.180.
57 Jeeves, 'The control of migratory labour', p.27.
58 The War in South Africa, 1900, p.230.
59 Richardson, *The provision of Chinese labour', p.56.
60 Peter Richardson, 'Coolies and Randlords: The North Randfontein Chinese Miners
"Str ike" of 1905', Journal of Southern African Studies II, 1976, p.492; Peter Richardson,
'The Role of the State in the labour-market for the Gold Mines: the case of Chinese labour,
1903-7*, unpublished paper presented to Conference on Southern African Labour History,
University of the Witwatersrand, Apri l 1976.
.61 Richardson, 'The recruiting of Chinese Labour,* p.101. By far the greatest number of
Chinese workers were employed by mines associated with the Wernher-Beit group of
companies. In establishing the Chamber of Mines Labour Importation Agency, the London
office of Wernher-Beit found the £100,000 needed for its preliminary expenses.
62 Richardson, 'Chinese indentured labour*, (see note 51).
63 R Hvam, 'Smuts and the magnanimous gesture,' Historical Journal, V I I I , 1965.
64 D Denoon, 'The Transvaal Labour Crisis, 1901-1906* Journal of African History V1I1,
1967, p.492.
65 Reply to deputation from While Labour League, 2 June 1903, Headlam I I , p.459.
66 Lionel Phillips (Johannesburg) to Messrs Wernher-Beit and Co, (London), 18 June
1906, in Frazcr and Jeeves, p.164.
At the Crown Deep at present Hailimond has 129 Dutchmen working. To keep this
number constantly going he has about 250 on the books which goes to show that they
only work half the time. Without doubt, however, this can gradually be improved, as it
is not so much their disinclination for steady work as the fact that they are mostly
married men who keep running off to spend a little time with their wives.
67 Not all the unemployed Afrikaners in the towns were men. Women were excluded from
working in the mines in the Transvaal but came to the towns in search of work in service
industries. Afrikaner women appear (o have come on to the labour market sooner than African
women because of both the distinction within their respective peasant societies beiween bride
wealth (paid by the men's family in African society) and dowry (paid by the women's family in
Afrikaner society) and a different division of labour within the family.
68 Percy FitzPatrick (Johannesburg) to Julius Wernher (London, 23 August 1902),in
Duminy and Guest, FitzPatrick, p.342. For the debate between FitzPatrick and his principals
in Wernher-Beit and Co. on the white labour issue see letters 152, 154, 157, 159 and 161 in
FitzPatrick.
69 RK Cope, Comrade Bill, Cape Town 1943, pp.40-3.
70 FhzPairick (Johannesburg) to Wernher (London), 12 Dec. 1898 in FitzPatrick, p.171.
71 MF Bilcnsky (May Katzen), 'The South African League. British Imperialist Organisa-
tion in South Africa, 1896-1899.' Unpublished master's thesis Universiiy of the Witwatersrand
1950, pp.60, 81-94. Republican legislation including measures such as the Aliens Immigration
Act and the Aliens Expulsion Act caused considerable unease among Uitlanders. In addition
economic life was made insecure by the speculative nature of much mining, and men were
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constantly being made unemployed. Their unemployment was aggravated, as Milner told
Chamberlain in May 1897, by ihe
isolated condition of the Rand as a commercial centre, ihe great number of the unem-
ployed have not the means to deport themselves lo another labour market. . . those
compelled to remain are likely to find themselves in a very serious condition indeed.
(Biiensky p.87)
72 VxMay, British Supremacy, pp. 171-3; Elaine Kau, A Trade Union Aristocracy, African
Studies Institute Johannesburg 1976 pp.63-4.
73 By contrast with the Standard and Diggers News, Landen Volk, which had been bitterly
anii-Kruger, was allowed a secret subsidy by the Milner administration even though it
transferred its hostility lo the new government. To be anti-government was not, however, the
same as being anti-capitalist.
74 MSS Brit Emp 402 Worsfold Papers Box 1/2 f 11; Wernher-Beit and Co 10 Basil
Worsfold, 11 Dec. 1903. In library of Rhodes House, Oxford.
75 MSS Brit Emp 402 Worsfold Papers ff 55; Basil Worsfold lo Chairman of Argus Group
resigning post 12 Jan. 1905. (Rhodes House)
76 C Van Onselen, 'The Witches of Suburbia: Domestic Service on the Witwaiersrand
1890-1914*, unpublished paper presented to the Societies of Southern Africa Seminar, London
1978. Also R Davies, 'Mining capital, the State and Unskilled White Workers in South Africa,
1901-1913', Journal of Southern African Studies, 111, 1976, pp.41-69.
77 Van Onselen, 'Johannesburg's Jehus, 1890-1914; An essay on cabs, cabbies and
iramways... ' and 'Ama Washa: The Zulu Washermen's Guild of the Witwatersrand, 1886-
1914' provide vivid insights into the social history of Johannesburg. These and other essays on
Johannesburg are lobe published in a two-volume history of the city between 189Oand 1914, and
will profoundly affect our understanding of the social history of the Rand.
78 Jeeves, 'The control of migratory labour', pp. 16-18.
79 There was, of course, the alternative offered by black peasant agriculture, which had
been the major source of local food production before the war. Trapido, 'Landlord and
tenant*; Cf P Lyttelton Gell to Milner, ] Feb. 1901 Milner Add. MSS. Eng. Hisi. C687,
Bodleian Library, Oxford.
It is the future settlement of the open country in the conquered territories which presents
such an 'impasse'. 11 seems to me lhat you have now no alternative but to establish the
Natives on the land, as Tenants of the Crown. We know they have as a rule been the
actual cultivators, and lhat in many cases they have worked upon a kind of metayer
system [sharecropping] for a Boer proprietor. If the Boer is an obstinate rebel, what can
be done except for ihe State to come into a direct connection with the cultivators and
herdsmen. They are, I suppose, in possession. Let the State confirm them in possession
and oblige them to pay to the State either in rent or kind or commuted service what
ihey have paid to their Boer lord.
80 British Parliamentary Papers 1903XLVCd 1551, Papers relating to the Progress of the
Administration in the Transvaal.
81 Parliamentary Papers 1903 XLV as above; 31 July 1902, pp.123-6: 'Experience had
clearly proved that those countries which...have made the greatest progress in agricultural
matters... are all notable examples of what can be accomplished by wisely directed Slate aid
acting in conjunction with private enterprise... *
82 Van Onselen, 'Reactions to Rinderpest in Southern Africa 1896-9', Journal of African
History, 1972, p.482:
His Honour the President of the South African Republic gave his high authority to the
efficiency of a somewhat complex mixture, consisting mainly of podophyllin, resin,
tobacco, paraffin oil, and a decoction of an incense plant. The result of the publication
of this remedy, I am credibly informed, was that the chemist's supply of podophyllin
became exhausted.
83 Lionel Phillips (London) to H Eckstein and Co, 26 May 1900, Lionel Phillips to G
Roulioi 9 Oct. 1901, in Frazer and Jeeves, pp.111, 112.
84 W Basil Worsfold, the Reconstruction of the New Colonies Under Lord Milner,
London 1913, II, pp.2, 91-116. Violet R Markham. The New Era in South Africa, London
1904 pp.43-68.
85 LBD (TAD) 73A, 376/05. Minutes of District Advisory Committee, Krugersdorp (and
Rustenburg). Transvaal Archive Depot.
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86 British Parliameniar>- Papers 1904 LXI Cd 2104, p.998, Further Papers relating to the
progress of Administration in the Transvaal.
87 AN Pelzet, "Die "arm-blanke" in die Suid Afrikaanse Republiek tussen die jare 1882-
1899,' Historiese Studies 11, 1941; and I I I , 1942.
88 Milner Papers Box 236, Imermediaie Report on Resettlement.
89 Transvaal Archive Depot. (TAD) Ll-Govcrnor 135/Nol 12/113 Richard Solomon to
Lord Sclbornc 5 Jan. 1906.
90 Trapido, "Landlord and tenant'; T Keegan, 'The Restructuring of Agrarian Class
Relations in a Colonial Economy: the Orange River Colony, 1902-1910,' Journal of Southern
African Studies, V, 234-254; T Keegan, 'Seasonally, Markets and Pricing: The South African
Maize Trade in the Early 20th Century', unpublished seminar paper. Institute of Common-
wealth Siudies, University of London, May 1979.
91 BJ Kruger, 'Diskussies en wetgewing rondom die landelike arbeidsvraagsmk in die Suid
Afrikaanse Republiek met besondere verwysing na die Plakkerwette, 1885-1889*. 'Unpub.
Masters thesis. University o f South Africa, 1965.
92 For an explicit statement of the role the reserves should play in subsidizing the
reproduction of the black labour force, see Howard Pirn,' Some Aspects of the South African
Native Problem*. South African Journal of Science, 4, 1905, cited in Legassick 'British
hegemony and the origins of segregation in South Africa", unpublished seminar paper
presetned to the seminar on 'Colonial Rule and Local Response', Institute of Commonwealth
Siudies, London, 1974. See also M Legassick and D Innes 'Capital Restructuring and
Aparlheid: a critique of a consiruciive engagement", African Affairs, Vol. 76, 1977, pp.465-6.
93 The need lo avoid an African uprising was constantly before the administration, and
partly explains their caution in responding to settler demands that Africans be expropriated
and their land and labour released for exploitation. The Bambatha rebellion in Natal (1906)
reinforced the message. See Shula Marks, Reluctant Rebellion: the 1906-8 Disturbances in
Natal. Oxford 1970.
94 M Legassick, 'The Making of South African "Native Policy", '903-23; the origins of
"segregation"**. Postgraduate seminar. Institute of Commonwealth Siudies, London, 1972.
95 The above paper and two others were part of a series presented by Legassick on
'Ideology and Social Structure in Twentieth-Century South Africa*. They constitute a major
contribution to the changing historiography of South Africa, and are part o f the essential
intellectual background to this paper.
96 For Milner's views on the harshness of the British industrial revolution, and the
necessity for forms of state regulation 'and the self-imposed solidarity o f individuals of the
Trades Unions' to modify its effects, see his lectures to working men in the East End of
London on 'Socialism and Robert Owen", republished in the National Review, March 1931,
pp.348-50; and 'Robert Owen and Socialism*. National Review, February 1931, pp.185-6.
97 New Left Review, no.67, May-June 1971, esp. 88-91. In the South African case, what
Murray calls "economic liberalization', the abolition of restrictions on the movement of people
and goods, had a limited meaning for Africans, whose movements were still governed by the
pass laws — demanded by the mining industry.
98 See D Denoon, 'Capital and Capiialists in the Transvaal in the 1890s and 1900s: a
non-regressive revision', forthcoming and '"Capitalist Influence" and the Transvaal Govern-
ment during the Crown Colony Period, 1900-1906' op. cit. Quite how close the relationship
between Milner and Wernher-Beil and Company was is revealed in the letter from Lionel
Phillips to W Reyersbach, 13 Nov. 1903:
One thing we must always bear in mind in considering the action of the Government in
the Transvaal, viz., that in refusing the offer of the Colonial Secretaryship, Lord Milner
to some extent, was guided by our opinion and influence. {All that Glittered, pp.122-3).
99 In part a response to the uncertainly over the future of Chinese labour.
100 J Wernher to FiizPatrick, 6 Feb. 1906, FitzPatrick p.420.
101 Lionel Phillips to Julius Wernher, 3 June 1907. All that Glittered, p.179.
102 Simons and Simons, p.87.
103 Katz, p.138-9.
104 All that Glittered, p. 179.
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